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Abstract
There are few models of price competition in a homogeneous-good market which
permit general asymmetries of information amongst the sellers. This work studies a
price game with discontinuous payoffs in which both costs and market demand are ex
ante uncertain. The sellers evaluate uncertain profits with maximin expected utilities
exhibiting ambiguity aversion. The buyers in the market are permitted to split between
sellers tieing at the minimum price in arbitrary ways which may be deterministic or
random. The role of the primitives in determining equilibrium prices in the market is
analyzed in detail.
Keywords Ambiguity · Maximin utilities · Asymmetric information · Game theory
1 Introduction
In a classic Bertrand price competition, goods are homogeneous and sellers select
their price with complete information regarding the structure of market demand, their
production costs, and the production technologies of their competitors. The lowest
priced seller secures all forthcoming demand or an equal share if multiple sellers tie.
This environment is far from realistic. Demand and costs are typically uncertain at the
ex ante stage and sellers will possess different information about the state of the world.
Sharing rules may also be different from equal sharing at price ties. Can we guarantee
equilibrium existence in such a market with discontinuous payoffs, arbitrary sharing
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at price ties, and incomplete, asymmetric information across sellers? Surprisingly, this
fundamental issue remains an open question.
One might wonder why it is worth studying price competition in the context of
ambiguity? The first point to emphasise is that there are few papers which study price
competition in the context of any form of uncertainty.1 The reason for this is prob-
ably technical: Bertrand competition in a homogeneous-good market is a game with
discontinuous payoffs and there are few existence results for Nash equilibria in such
contexts. The second point is that, in the context of a one-shot game, assuming stan-
dard uncertainty (that a seller can assign probabilities to all relevant states) is a strong
and often unrealistic assumption. Therefore, in this context, permitting ambiguity is
more plausible (and our model does contain the special case in which sellers can assign
probabilities to all states of the world). Our work is particularly interesting because, by
introducing ambiguity into the standard Bertrand price game, we are able to provide
straightforward pure strategy equilibrium existence results, despite the game having
discontinuous payoffs.
In the model, we study there are three primitives: the market demand, the sellers’
cost functions and the sharing rule at price ties. Uncertainty is permitted to affect
both the market demand and the cost functions (and could be extended to the sharing
rule, but we omit this to keep the notation as simple as possible). In this context, it is
plausible that a seller knows their own costs (which we assume) but is uncertain about
other sellers’ costs and the market demand. Indeed, there is a large literature studying
market competition under uncertainty when sellers know the relevant probabilities
(Vives 1999, Ch.8). In a one-shot game, though, a seller has no previous history upon
which to base the probabilities of different states of the world. Consequently, a seller is
unlikely to be able to assign probabilities to different market states with any certainty
or confidence.2 In this context, ambiguity aversion is a more appropriate decision rule
to use.
We consider sellers that face ambiguity regarding exogenously specified state-
contingent demand and cost functions and information is asymmetric across sellers. An
information partition containing multiple states captures states of the world between
which the seller cannot distinguish. In this incomplete information game, ambigu-
ity averse sellers simultaneously and independently choose prices to maximise their
maximin expected utilities (MEU) as in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Maximin
preferences have gained significant traction in recent years as an alternative to the
increasingly refuted Bayesian paradigm.3
Our objective is to provide new conditions under which pure strategy price equilibria
exist, whilst permitting discontinuities in the demand function, asymmetric informa-
tion across sellers and arbitrary price-tie sharing rules. The prices chosen by sellers
must also be measurable with respect to their private information, which reflects the
way in which sellers’ information partitions constrains their choices of prices. In this
1 Notable exceptions are Spulber (1995) and Wambach (1999). Although in both these papers, the uncer-
tainty is ex ante symmetric. Our model permits general asymmetries of information.
2 See, amongst others, the discussion in de Castro and Yannelis (2011) and He and Yannelis (2015a).
3 See for instance: Allingham (2002, Ch.3), Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2013), Correia-da-Silva and Hervés-
Beloso (2009, 2012); de Castro and Yannelis 2011; He and Yannelis (2015a, 2017a,b); Pulford and Colman
(2007).
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context, we are able to provide direct and constructive existence results for a pure
strategy price equilibrium in the incomplete information game.4
We show that two relatively mild conditions are sufficient to guarantee a continuum
of pure strategy price equilibria, which lend to a wide range of applications. Firstly,
there exist at least two sellers of each information type. Secondly, cost functions are not
too different. This strictly generalises previous results that hinged critically on equal or
winner-takes-all sharing rules.5 The first condition overcomes the well-known ‘open-
set’ problem, where the best response of the seller may not be well defined.6 Requiring
that no seller has a unique information partition, combined with similar costs, ensures
that we are able to construct equilibria in which sellers with symmetric information
choose the same price. Therefore, a seller cannot profitably increase their price as
they will be tied with at least one rival. This condition is also reasonably unrestrictive
and will be satisfied if we consider the case where the set of sellers is replicated any
number of times (as in Debreu and Scarf 1963).
Of particular interest in our model is the relationship between the ex post equilibrium
sets and pure strategy Nash equilibria in the ex ante price game. It is well known that
in complete information price games with sellers who have strictly convex costs there
often exists a continuum of pure strategy Nash equilibria (Dastidar 1995; Vives 1999,
p.122). In this work, we have been able to find a connection between these ex post
equilibrium sets and the Nash equilibria of the ex ante game: with maximin expected
utilities, one can construct ex ante Nash equilibria by carefully selecting equilibria
from the ex post equilibrium sets. A similar point has been noted by He and Yannelis
(2017a) for discontinuous games with asymmetric information satisfying the Reny
(1999) conditions. However, unlike them, we still require that the prices posted in the
marketplace be measurable with respect to the private information of the sellers.
Many departures from the classical Bertrand setup have been extensively explored
in the literature. Recent developments include generalising existence results to permit
discontinuities in demand and cost functions (Baye and Morgan 2002), a wider range
of production technologies (Saporiti and Coloma 2010; Baye and Kovenock 2008),
arbitrary sharing rules at price ties (Bagh 2010; Hoernig 2007), and incomplete and
(possibly) differential information amongst sellers. This paper makes contributions
that span all these active directions of research.
Section 2 presents the Bertrand game we study. Section 3 outlines existence con-
ditions for pure strategy equilibrium. Section 4 provides illustrative examples which
should give the reader a clear understanding of the results, and their wide applicability.
Section 5 discusses related literature on price competition and ambiguity. Finally, we
present some concluding remarks about directions for future research in this area.
4 Being able to give direct and constructive existence results regarding pure equilibria is unusual when one
departs from the classical complete information game of Bertrand competition. Recent papers have shown
that finding an equilibrium point in more complex setting can be difficult, and often equilibria only exist in
mixed strategies. See, for a recent example of a behavioural Bertrand price game, Edwards (2019).
5 Winner-takes-all sharing specifies that one of the tied sellers at the minimum price is selected randomly
to serve the entire market.
6 See Vives (1999, p.123), and Blume (2003), for a discussion of this problem.
123
R. R. Routledge and R. A. Edwards
2 The Bertrand Game
The model consists of a finite set of sellers N = {1, ..., n}, n ≥ 2, who are producing
a single perfectly homogeneous good. The uncertainty will be modelled by a finite
set  = {ω1, ..., ωm} which is the set of possible states of the world. There is a
probability distribution, μ, over the set  which describes the probability of each
state occurring. It shall be assumed that μ(ω) > 0 for every ω ∈  so no state
of the world is redundant. Each seller has a state-contingent cost function given by
Ci : + ×  → +. The following conditions are imposed upon the cost functions.
Assumption 2.1 For every i ∈ N, and every ω ∈ , Ci (·, ω) is strictly convex, strictly
increasing and satisfies Ci (0, ω) = 0.
There is a state-contingent market demand function for the homogeneous good
given by D : + × → +. The following conditions are imposed upon the demand
function.
Assumption 2.2 For every ω ∈ , there exist positive finite real numbers x¯(ω) and
y¯(ω) such that D(x, ω) = 0 for all x ≥ x¯(ω), and D(0, ω) = y¯(ω). The function
D(·, ω) is strictly decreasing on (0, x¯(ω)).
Note that no continuity, or any smoothness conditions, is imposed upon the demand
function for the good. As is standard in asymmetric information models, the private
information of seller i is modelled by an algebra i on the set . Let Pi be the
partition of the set  associated with i (the minimal elements in i for which no
strict subset is also contained in i ). Let  = ∩i∈N i and P() be the partition of
 associated with the coarsest algebra, , generated by the intersection of the sellers’
algebras. Whenever two states of the world are in the same element in the partition Pi ,
it is taken that seller i is unable to distinguish between those two states. A function
f :  → + will be called Pi -measurable if, whenever ωp ∈ E and ωq ∈ E for
some event E ∈ Pi , then f (ωp) = f (ωq). Facing these information restrictions, the
strategy set of seller i in the Bertrand game is
Li = { f :  → + : f is Pi − measurable}.
Let L = ×i∈N Li be the joint strategy set. It shall be taken as given that a seller knows
their cost function before posting their price in the marketplace. To avoid a seller being
able to infer more information about the state of the world than that given by their
partition, the following condition is imposed upon the cost functions.
Assumption 2.3 For every i ∈ N, the function Ci (·, ω) is Pi -measurable.
In the classical Bertrand game sellers post prices in the market with a commitment
to meet all the market demand forthcoming.7 As a result, consumers will buy from the
sellers posting the minimum price in the market. At this point, it becomes necessary
7 An excellent and succinct summary of the differences between Bertrand competition and Bertrand–
Edgeworth competition (which does permit rationing of the market demand) is Vives (1999, Ch.5).
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to specify what happens when different sellers tie at the minimum price. How is the
market demand split between them? The most commonly used rule in the literature is
the “equal sharing” rule which assumes that sellers tieing at the minimum price receive
an equal share of the market demand. However, this is clearly restrictive and recent
research has indicated that the existence and nature of equilibria in Bertrand price
games are highly sensitive to the choice of the sharing rule at minimum price ties.8
Given this problem, we shall consider general classes of random and deterministic
sharing rules. Let the set Si be given by
Si = {S ⊆ N : i ∈ S and |S| ≥ 2}.
The set Si is all the possible coalitions of sellers which i could tie with at the minimum
price.
2.1 The sharing rules
A deterministic sharing rule is a set of functions {gi,S}i∈N ,S∈Si satisfying gi,S :
+ → (0, 1) with S ∈ Si and ∑i∈S gi,S(x) = 1 for every x ∈ +. In words, a
sharing rule for seller i with coalition S ∈ Si is a function which maps the price tied at
into the share of the market demand received. Given a deterministic sharing rule, the
shared profit when seller i ∈ N ties at the minimum price with S ∈ Si other sellers is
πi,S(x, ω) = xgi,S(x)D(x, ω) − Ci (gi,S(x)D(x, ω), ω).
A random sharing rule is again a set of functions {hi,S}i∈N ,S∈Si satisfying hi,S :
+ → (0, 1) and ∑i∈S hi,S(x) = 1 for every x ∈ +. However, the number assigned
to each seller does not represent the share of the market demand received, but the
probability of seller i being chosen to meet all the market demand. The complete set
of random sharing rules is given by {hi,S}i∈N ,S∈Si . Given a random sharing rule, the
shared profit when seller i ∈ N ties at the minimum price with S ∈ Si other sellers is
πi,S(x, ω) = hi,S(x)(x D(x, ω) − Ci (D(x, ω), ω)).
Remark 2.1 This way of specifying the sharing rules at price ties contains the deter-
ministic equal sharing rule, and the random winner-takes-all sharing rule, as special
cases. If one sets gi,S(x) = 1/|S| for every x ∈ +, S ∈ Si and every i ∈ N , the
standard equal sharing rule is restored. If one sets hi,S(x) = 1/|S| for every x ∈ +,
S ∈ Si and every i ∈ N , the winner-takes all sharing rule is captured. There are clearly
uncountably many other possible sharing rules which are contained in this framework.
It may be noted we are imposing that, unlike the cost and demand functions, the shar-
ing rule is independent of the state of the world. All the results which follow could be
readily extended to permit the sharing rule to also be state contingent, without many
changes, although this would make the notation a little more complicated.
8 See for example Vives (1999, pp.117–123), Hoernig (2007) and Bagh (2010).
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2.2 The ex post payoffs
Given the specification of the sharing rules at minimum price ties it is now possible
to describe the profits in the ex post games. The monopoly profit of seller i in state
ω ∈  when posting price x is
πi (x, ω) = x D(x, ω) − Ci (D(x, ω), ω).
The deterministic shared profit when seller i ∈ N ties at the minimum price with
S ∈ Si other sellers in state ω ∈  given deterministic sharing rules {gi,S}i∈N ,S∈Si is
πi,S(x, ω) = xgi,S(x)D(x, ω) − Ci (gi,S(x)D(x, ω), ω).
The random shared profit when seller i ∈ N ties at the minimum price with S ∈ Si
other sellers in state ω ∈  given random sharing rules {hi,S}i∈N ,S∈Si is
πi,S(x, ω) = hi,S(x)(x D(x, ω) − Ci (D(x, ω), ω)) = hi,S(x)πi (x, ω).
The following mild conditions are imposed upon the monopoly and tied profit
functions.
Assumption 2.4 For every i ∈ N, ω ∈  and S ∈ Si , the functions πi (·, ω) and
πi,S(·, ω) satisfy the following:
(i) They are left lower semicontinuous.
(ii) There exist prices at which they achieve a strictly positive value.
Remark 2.2 The conditions in Assumption 2.4 are widely known in the literature
and are discussed in detail in, amongst others, Baye and Morgan (2002) and Bagh
(2010). Left lower semicontinuity permits that a function can jump downwards as it
is approached from the left, but not from the right. From Assumption 2.1, the cost
functions of all the sellers are strictly convex, so any discontinuities generated in the
profit functions must come about from discontinuities in the demand function. Taken
together, the two conditions in Assumption 2.4 guarantee that there exist solutions to
the equations πi (x, ω) = 0 and πi,S(x, ω) = 0 in the region 0 ≤ x ≤ x¯(ω).
Given the specifications of all the different profit functions, the full payoffs in the
discontinuous game can be summarized. Fix a vector of strategies f = ( f1, ..., fn) ∈
L , the ex post payoff which seller i obtains in state ω ∈  is
ui ( f , ω) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
πi ( fi (ω), ω), if fi (ω) < f j (ω) for all j 	= i;
πi,S( fi (ω), ω), if i ties with S ∈ Si sellers at min. price;
0 if there is a j s.t. f j (ω) < fi (ω).
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2.3 The ex ante payoffs
Let us now turn to consider how, at the ex ante stage, before each seller has received
the information regarding which element in Pi the state of the world is in, the sell-
ers evaluate their expected payoff. As noted in the introduction, standard Bayesian
expected payoffs are difficult to work with in this context. Given this difficulty, we
consider a well-known alternative expected payoff: maximin expected utilities. If a
seller knows that the state of the world is contained in E ∈ Pi , we consider the case
where the seller is pessimistic and assigns all the probability associated with event E ,
which is μ(E), to the minimum ex post payoff in E . To this end, let X be the set of
probability distributions over :
X =
{
x ∈  : x(ω) ≥ 0 for every ω ∈  and
∑
ω∈
x(ω) = 1
}
and let Mi be the set of probability distributions which agree with seller i’s private
information:
Mi = {x ∈ X : x(E) = μ(E) for every E ∈ Pi } .
Clearly Mi ⊆ X . Fixing a vector of strategies f = ( f1, ..., fn) ∈ L the ex ante payoff
of seller i is:
Ui ( f ) = min
x∈Mi
[
∑
ω∈
x(ω)ui ( f , ω)
]
.
An alternative, but equivalent expression of the ex ante payoffs, which is often easier
to analyze, is
Ui ( f ) =
∑
E∈Pi
μ(E)
[
min
ω∈E ui ( f , ω)
]
.
It is worth noting that if seller i ′s information partition Pi contains all singletons,
then maximin expected utility coincides with standard Bayesian expected utilities.
Therefore, the type of ex ante evaluation of the payoffs we are considering can be seen
as a generalization of Bayesian expected utilities.
Remark 2.3 Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) provided an axiomatic characterization
of this type of maximin decision rule in the context of ambiguity aversion. It is well
known that although this type of decision rule is quite simple it is capable of explaining
the Ellsberg (1961) violations of standard subjective expected utility theory. In recent
years, maximin expected utilities, and similar variants, have been used in a wide
range of papers, including Correia-da-Silva and Hervés-Beloso (2009), de Castro and
Yannelis (2011) and He and Yannelis (2015a). More generally, maximin expected
utilities are a generalization of families of choice problems under ignorance (where
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some relevant parameter is unknown to the decision maker). An excellent summary of
philosophical choice in the context of ignorance, including maximin expected utilities,
is contained in Peterson (2017).
Now that we have defined the ex ante payoffs, we can define the equilibrium concept.
A set of strategies f = ( f1, ..., fn) ∈ L is a pure strategy price equilibrium if, for
every i ∈ N
Ui ( f ) ≥ Ui ( f ′i , f−i ) for every f ′i ∈ Li .
The primitives of a price game with asymmetric information and sharing rules
can be summarized by G = (N ,, (Ci , Pi )i∈N , {ri,S}i∈N ,S∈Si , D, μ), r ∈ {g, h}. In
a price game with asymmetric information and sharing rules, G, two sellers i, j ∈ N
will be described as being of the same information type if Pi = Pj . In words, sellers
i and j are of the same information type if their information partitions are the same.
For any game G, let T G be the unique partition of the player set N with the two
properties: (i) if T ∈ T G and i, j ∈ T then i and j are of the same information type
(ii) if T , T ′ ∈ T G and i ∈ T , j ∈ T ′ then i and j are not of the same information
type.
3 Existence of pure strategy price equilibrium
Before turning to the existence results, a little bit of notation will be useful. Fix a price
game G = (N ,, (Ci , Pi )i∈N , {ri,S}i∈N ,S∈Si , D, μ), r ∈ {g, h} and for each i ∈ N ,
S ∈ Si and ω ∈  let the real numbers li,S(ω) and mi (ω) be defined as:
li,S(ω) = min{x |0 ≤ x < x¯(ω) and πi,S(x, ω) ≥ 0}
mi (ω) = min{x |0 ≤ x < x¯(ω) and πi (x, ω) ≥ 0}.
li,S(ω) defines the lowest breakeven price for player i when tied at the lowest price
in the market with coalition S. mi (ω) defines the lowest breakeven price for player i
when the firm posts the lowest price in the market and becomes the monopoly supplier.
Let C = {S ⊆ N : |S| ≥ 2}. For each S ∈ C , and ω ∈ , define the interval IS(ω)
to be
IS(ω) = ∩i∈S(li,S(ω), mi (ω)).
One final assumption is imposed upon the primitives of a price game with a
deterministic sharing rule. This assumption simply requires that, with a deterministic
sharing rule, regardless of which coalition a seller ties with, their demand forthcoming
is decreasing in the price tied at.
Assumption 3.1 Fix a price game G = (N ,, (Ci , Pi )i∈N , {ri,S}i∈N ,S∈Si , D, μ)
with a deterministic sharing rule r = g, for every i ∈ N and S ∈ Si , the functions
gi,S(·)D(·, ω) are decreasing on (0, x¯(ω)).
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The following existence results use Lemmas 7.1–7.3 which, for brevity, are con-
tained in the Appendix.
Proposition 3.1 Fix a price game G = (N ,, (Ci , Pi )i∈N , {ri,S}i∈N ,S∈Si , D, μ) with
a deterministic sharing rule r = g, if for every E ∈ P(),
∩ω∈E IN (ω) 	= ∅
then the game G possesses infinitely many pure strategy price equilibria.
Proof Suppose for every E ∈ P(), ∩ω∈E IN (ω) 	= ∅. We shall directly construct
one such equilibrium. For each E ∈ P(), select an x E ∈ ∩ω∈E IN (ω). Define the
strategies of the sellers to be
f ∗i (E) = x E for every i ∈ N .
By construction, these strategies are Pi -measurable for each seller. Hence, f ∗i ∈ Li
for every i ∈ N .
It follows from Lemma 7.2 that πi,N (x E , ω) ≥ 0 for every ω ∈ E . Therefore, for
every i ∈ N , and E ∈ Pi ,
μ(E)[min
ω∈E ui ( f
∗, ω)] ≥ 0
and
Ui ( f ∗) =
∑
E∈Pi
μ(E)[min
ω∈E ui ( f
∗, ω)] ≥ 0.
Suppose, for some E ∈ Pi , seller i decided to deviate by choosing
fi (E) = x < x E .
Across all the states in E all the other sellers post price x E . As a consequence, seller
i would post the minimum price in the market whenever the state of the world is in E .
However, as x < x E < mi (ω) for every ω ∈ E , πi (x, ω) < 0 for every ω ∈ E
and
μ(E)[min
ω∈E ui ( fi , f
∗−i , ω)] < 0.
This is not a profitable deviation. Alternatively, suppose for some E ∈ Pi seller i
decided to deviate by choosing
fi (E) = x > x E .
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Then, for all the states in E , i never posts the minimum price in the market and
ui ( fi , f ∗−i , ω) = 0 for every ω ∈ E . Hence
μ(E)[min
ω∈E ui ( fi , f
∗−i , ω)] = 0.
This is not a profitable deviation. As ∩ω∈E IN (ω) is the intersection of finitely many
open sets, ∩ω∈E IN (ω) is also an open set, and it follows that there are infinitely many
pure strategy price equilibria. unionsq
One might reasonably ask when the conditions of Proposition 3.1 are likely to be
satisfied. If the cost functions of the sellers are not too different, the sharing rule is
not too different from the standard equal sharing rule, and the market demands across
the different states are quite similar, then the game is likely to satisfy the conditions.
An example of this is presented in the next section. The intuition behind the result is
that sometimes, the primitives of the game are such that one can select a set of prices
which are P()-measurable and which are also Nash equilibria in the games defined
by the ex post payoffs. The next result demonstrates that even if one cannot make a
selection of prices which are P()-measurable and are Nash equilibria in the games
formed by the ex post payoffs, there may still exist a pure strategy price equilibrium.
Proposition 3.2 Fix a price game G = (N ,, (Ci , Pi )i∈N , {ri,S}i∈N ,S∈Si , D, μ) with
a deterministic sharing rule r = g, if the following two conditions are satisfied:
(i) For every T ∈ T G, |T | ≥ 2.
(ii) For every ω ∈ , ∩S∈C IS(ω) 	= ∅.
Then, the game G possesses infinitely many pure strategy price equilibria.
Proof Let G be a game satisfying the conditions in the proposition. We shall directly
construct one such equilibrium of the game. Let {xω}ω∈ be a set of real numbers such
that, for every ω ∈ ,
xω ∈ ∩S∈C IS(ω).
For each i ∈ N and E ∈ Pi define the strategies of the sellers to be
f ∗i (E) = max
ω∈E xω.
By construction, these strategies are Pi -measurable for each seller. Hence f ∗i ∈ Li
for every i ∈ N . In each state of the world, a seller either does not post the minimum
price in the market, or ties at the minimum price with some coalition.
From the definition of the strategies, for each ω ∈ E ∈ Pi
f ∗i (ω) = max
ω∈E xω > li,S(ω
′) for every ω′ ∈ E and S ∈ Si .
It follows from Lemma 7.2, that πi,S( f ∗i (ω), ω) ≥ 0 for every ω ∈ E and S ∈ Si .
Therefore, for each ω ∈ E
ui ( f ∗, ω) ≥ 0
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and
min
ω∈E ui ( f
∗, ω) ≥ 0
and as μ(E) > 0
μ(E)[min
ω∈E ui ( f
∗, ω)] ≥ 0
and consequently
Ui ( f ∗) =
∑
E∈Pi
[min
ω∈E ui ( f
∗, ω)] ≥ 0.
Suppose, for some E ∈ Pi , i decided to deviate to fi (E) < maxω∈E xω. Because
fi (E) < maxω∈E xω, in one state in E i posts the unique minimum price in the
market and obtains negative profit. Consequently
min
ω∈E ui ( fi , f
∗−i , ω) < 0.
This is not a profitable deviation. Alternatively, suppose for some E ∈ Pi , i decided
to deviate to fi (E) > maxω∈E xω. As |T | ≥ 2, for every T ∈ T G , i never posts the
minimum price in the market in any state in E , and
min
ω∈E ui ( fi , f
∗−i , ω) = 0.
This is not a profitable deviation. As ∩S∈C IS(ω) is the intersection of finitely many
open intervals, it is also an open set and it follows that one can construct infinitely
many pure strategy price equilibria. unionsq
The conditions in Proposition 3.2 will be satisfied when the sellers’ cost functions
are not too different, and the sharing rule is not too far from the standard equal sharing
rule. However, unlike the conditions in Proposition 3.1, the market demand can vary
greatly across the different states, and the conditions in Proposition 3.2 can still be
satisfied.
The intuition behind the two conditions in the proposition is as follows. Condition
(i) says that no seller has a monopoly over their information partition. This solves the
well-known “open-set” technical problem in Bertrand games where one seller may
wish to price as close as possible, but slightly below, the price of another seller (in
which case the best response is an empty set). Condition (ii) makes it possible for us to
find a set of prices at which, in each state of the world, a seller knows that whichever
other sellers he may tie with he is always guaranteed non-negative profit. As we are
searching for sufficient conditions for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium, it
might be asked whether the conditions in (i) and (ii) can be significantly weakened in
any way. This does not seem possible because it is easy to find games which satisfy
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one of the conditions, but violate the other, and fail to possess a pure strategy price
equilibrium.
An interesting question is how the price equilibrium constructed in the proof of
Proposition 3.2 compares with the price equilibrium in a market with no ambiguity.
Under condition (ii) of the proposition, the set IN (ω) is non-empty for every ω ∈ .
If there was no ambiguity in the market, and the sellers could identify each state of
the world, then the price equilibrium would have all the sellers setting the same price
in IN (ω). The reason this does not always happen in the equilibrium constructed in
the proof of Proposition 3.2 is because the ambiguity aversion makes them reluctant
to lower their prices when uncertain of the state of the world. Consequently, with
ambiguity, one could observe the sellers posting different prices in the market.
The next result gives similar conditions to Proposition 3.2 that guarantee equilib-
rium existence with a random sharing rule.
Proposition 3.3 Fix a price game G = (N ,, (Ci , Pi )i∈N , {ri,S}i∈N ,S∈Si , D, μ) with
a random sharing rule r = h, if the following two conditions are satisfied:
(i) For every T ∈ T G, |T | ≥ 2.
(ii) Ci (·, ω) = C j (·, ω) for every i 	= j and every ω ∈ .
Then, the game G possesses a pure strategy price equilibrium.
Proof As Ci (·, ω) = C j (·, ω) for every i 	= j and every ω ∈ , then mi (ω) =
m j (ω) = m(ω) for every i 	= j . For each i ∈ N and E ∈ Pi , define the strategies of
the sellers to be
f ∗i (E) = max
ω∈E m(ω).
By construction these strategies are Pi -measurable for each seller. Hence, f ∗i ∈ Li
for every i ∈ N .
Given these strategies, for each ω ∈  seller i either does not post the minimum
price in the market or i ties with some coalition at the minimum price. If i ties at
the minimum price with coalition S ∈ Si in state ω he obtains πi,S( f ∗i (ω), ω) =
hi,S( f ∗i (ω))πi ( f ∗i (ω), ω). From the construction of the strategies, and Lemma 7.3, it
follows that for every E ∈ Pi , and every ω ∈ E , πi ( f ∗i (ω), ω) ≥ 0. Hence, for every
ω ∈ ,
ui ( f ∗, ω) ≥ 0
and for every E ∈ Pi
min
ω∈E ui ( f
∗, ω) ≥ 0.
Furthermore, as μ(E) > 0,
μ(E)[min
ω∈E ui ( f
∗, ω)] ≥ 0
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and
Ui ( f ∗) =
∑
E∈Pi
[min
ω∈E ui ( f
∗, ω)] ≥ 0.
Suppose, for some E ∈ Pi , i decided to deviate to fi (E) < maxω∈E m(ω). Then
min
ω∈E ui ( fi , f
∗−i , ω) < 0
because the minimum is at least as low as i obtaining the monopoly profit in one state
at a price less than the corresponding m(ω). Consequently
μ(E)[min
ω∈E ui ( fi , f
∗−i , ω)] < 0.
This is not a profitable deviation. Suppose, for some E ∈ Pi , i decided to deviate to
fi (E) > maxω∈E m(ω). Then, because for each T ∈ T G , |T | ≥ 2, i never posts the
minimum price in the market in any state in E and consequently
min
ω∈E ui ( fi , f
∗−i , ω) = 0
and
μ(E)[min
ω∈E ui ( fi , f
∗−i , ω)] = 0.
This is not a profitable deviation. unionsq
It is worth noting that the existence results in Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 are both
direct and constructive. Often with discontinuous games, we can establish that an
equilibrium exists, but actually finding an equilibrium can be difficult. This illustrates
the advantage of using maximin expected utilities at the ex ante stage. With maximin
expected utilities, we simply have to find prices at which undercutting in one possible
state of the world may make a seller worse off to prevent them wanting to undercut
(because they consider the most pessimistic outcome when contemplating a deviation).
With Bayesian expected utilities, this is no longer the case, and the equilibrium exis-
tence problem is significantly more complicated. This is probably one of the reasons
why little work has been undertaken to examine equilibrium existence in incomplete
information Bertrand games.
Proposition 3.4 Fix a price game G = (N ,, (Ci , Pi )i∈N , {ri,S}i∈N ,S∈Si , D, μ) with
a deterministic sharing rule r = g, if the following two conditions are satisfied:
(i) For every T ∈ T G, |T | ≥ 2.
(ii) Ci (·, ω) = C j (·, ω) for every i 	= j and every ω ∈ .
Then, the game G possesses infinitely many pure strategy price equilibria.
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Proof As Ci (·, ω) = C j (·, ω) for every i 	= j and every ω ∈ , it follows that
mi (ω) = m j (ω) = m(ω) for every i 	= j . From Lemma 7.1, li,S(ω) < m(ω) for
every S ∈ Si and i ∈ N . Therefore
∩S∈C IS(ω) 	= ∅ for every ω ∈ .
The game G satisfies all the conditions of Proposition 3.2 and it follows that there are
infinitely many pure strategy price equilibria. unionsq
3.1 Discussion of the results
An initial point worth noting about Propositions 3.1–3.4 is that the proofs of the exis-
tence results are direct and constructive. This is in contrast to many general existence
results for discontinuous games, such as Reny (1999) and He and Yannelis (2015b),
which give conditions on the primitives that guarantee the existence of equilibrium,
but do not show how to find such equilibria. Furthermore, the equilibrium existence
results in the aforementioned papers do not apply to the game studied here because in
our model sellers can have tied payoffs which are greater than non-tied payoffs (when
both are positive) which violates the concept of payoff security.
It is well known that in complete information price games with strictly convex
costs, there may exist a continuum of pure strategy Nash equilibria (Dastidar 1995;
Bagh 2010). In Proposition 3.1, we show that if each ex post game has a continuum of
equilibria, and it is possible to make a selection from each of the ex post equilibrium
sets which is measurable with respect to the intersection of the sellers’ information
algebras, then the ex ante game possesses a pure strategy price equilibrium. This
is quite intuitive because if such a selection exists, then each seller knows they are
playing a Nash equilibrium regardless of which state of the world occurs. In this sense,
the equilibrium constructed in the proof of Proposition 3.1 is often termed “ex post
stable.” This means no seller would wish to change their price after the uncertainty is
resolved and the state of the world is revealed to them.
Proposition 3.2 reveals the advantage of maximin expected utilities for demonstrat-
ing existence of equilibrium. Condition (ii) of the result means that there is a set of
prices in each state of the world such that each seller knows if they tie with any other
number of sellers then they are guaranteed non-negative profits. By selecting prices
from these sets, and having the sellers play the maximum of such prices when they are
uncertain of the state of the world, the sellers are guaranteed non-negative profits. The
maximin expected utilities stop them wanting to undercut their rivals’ prices for fear
of obtaining negative profits when uncertain of the state of the world. With Bayesian
expected utilities, this may not be the case, and a seller may be willing to lower their
price if the expected profit is an improvement. Condition (i) in Proposition 3.2 is
essentially a technical requirement which permits us to avoid “open-set” problems
of the nature discussed in Blume (2003): when one seller has a cost advantage and
would like to post a price as close as possible, but just below, their rival’s price (and
consequently the best response set is not defined). If condition (i) is satisfied, then
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each seller knows there is another seller of the same type in the market who will post
the same price.
In a complete information price game with a random sharing rule, the equilibrium
would tend to involve the sellers tieing at the monopoly breakeven price (Baye and
Morgan 2002), as long as the sellers have the same cost functions. What Proposi-
tion 3.3 does is extend this concept to an incomplete information setting. Condition
(ii) ensures that the sellers have the same cost functions, and hence, the same monopoly
breakeven prices. In the constructed equilibrium, each seller plays the maximum
monopoly breakeven prices among the states of the world which they know could
occur. At these prices, sellers are guaranteed non-negative profits. Again, maximin
expected utilities means sellers are not willing to lower their prices, for fear of get-
ting negative profits. Condition (ii), as in Proposition 3.2, ensures that there are no
“open-set” problems in which a seller’s best response is not properly defined.
4 Illustrative examples
This section contains three detailed examples, which demonstrate the wide variety of
different price games with asymmetric information and sharing rules that the exis-
tence results in the previous section can be applied to. They should also help readers
understand the specific workings of the results in the previous section.
4.1 Example 1
Consider a price game with asymmetric information with two sellers, N = {1, 2}, and
two states of the world  = {ω1, ω2}. The information partitions of the sellers are
P1 = {{ω1}, {ω2}} and P2 = {}, so seller 1 is informed of the state of the world,
whereas seller 2 is totally uninformed. The probability distribution, μ, is μ(ω1) =
μ(ω2) = 1/2. The cost function of the sellers is Ci (x, ω) = x2 for every ω ∈ ,
i ∈ N . The sharing rule at price ties is deterministic and given by
g1,N = 35 and g2,N =
2
5
.
The state-contingent market demands are piecewise affine and given by D(x, ω1) =
max{0, 10−x} and D(x, ω2) = max{0, 11−x}. Given these market primitives, direct
calculation of the mi (ω) numbers in state 1 yields
m1(ω1) = m2(ω1) = 5.
Calculation of the li,S(ω) numbers, given the sharing rule is different from equal
sharing, yields
l1,N (ω1) = 334 and l2,N (ω1) = 2
6
7
.
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Therefore, IN (ω1) = (3 34 , 5). Repeating these calculations for state ω2 yields
m1(ω1) = m2(ω1) = 512
and
l1,N (ω2) = 418 and l2,N (ω2) = 3
1
7
.
Therefore, IN (ω2) = (4 18 , 5 12 ). As P() = {}, it follows that
∩ω∈ IN (ω) = (418 , 5) 	= ∅
and the game satisfies all the conditions of Proposition 3.1. One pure strategy price
equilibrium of the game is
f ∗i (ω) = 4
1
2
for every ω ∈  and i ∈ N .
4.2 Example 2
Consider a price game with asymmetric information with four sellers N = {1, 2, 3, 4}
and three states of the world  = {ω1, ω2, ω3}. The information partitions of the
sellers are
Pi = {{ω1, ω2}, {ω3}} for i = 1, 2
and
Pi = {{ω1}, {ω2, ω3}} for i = 3, 4.
The probability distribution, μ, is μ(ω1) = μ(ω2) = μ(ω3) = 1/3. The cost function
of the sellers is Ci (x, ω) = x2 for every ω ∈  and i ∈ N . The state-contingent
market demands are piecewise affine and are D(x, ω1) = max{0, 10−x}, D(x, ω2) =
max{0, 20 − x} and D(x, ω3) = max{0, 30 − x}. The sharing rule is deterministic
and is given by
gi,N = 14 for every i ∈ N .
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For three seller coalitions:
g1,{S} = 512 if |S| = 3
gi,S = 724 if |S| = 3, {1} ∈ S and i 	= 1
gi,S = 13 for every i ∈ S if |S| = 3 and {1} /∈ S.
Finally, for two seller coalitions:
gi,S = 12 for every i ∈ S if |S| = 2.
Given these primitives, after calculating the mi (ω) and li,S(ω) numbers, one finds
∩S∈C IS(ω1) = (313 , 5) 	= ∅
∩S∈C IS(ω2) = (623 , 10) 	= ∅
and
∩S∈C IS(ω3) = (10, 15) 	= ∅.
Therefore, the game satisfies all the conditions of Propositions 3.2 and 3.4. One pure
strategy price equilibrium of the game is
f ∗i ({ω1, ω2}) = 8 and f ∗i ({ω3}) = 12 for i = 1, 2
and
f ∗i ({ω1}) = 4 and f ∗i ({ω2, ω3}) = 12 for i = 3, 4.
4.3 Example 3
Consider a price game with asymmetric information with four sellers N = {1, 2, 3, 4}
and three states of the world  = {ω1, ω2, ω3}. The information partitions of the
sellers are
Pi = {} for i = 1, 2
and
Pi = {{ω1}, {ω2, ω3}} for i = 3, 4.
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The probability distribution, μ, is μ(ω1) = μ(ω2) = μ(ω3) = 1/3. The cost function
of the sellers is Ci (x, ω) = x2 for every ω ∈  and i ∈ N . The state-contingent
market demands are discontinuous and are given by
D(x, ω1) =
{
10 − x, if x < 7;
max{0, 15 − x} if x ≥ 7.
D(x, ω2) =
{
20 − x, if x < 15;
max{0, 25 − x} if x ≥ 15.
D(x, ω3) =
{
30 − x, if x < 20;
max{0, 35 − x} if x ≥ 20.
The sharing rule is random and is given by
hi,N = 14 for every i ∈ N .
For three seller coalitions:
h1,{S} = 512 if |S| = 3
hi,S = 724 if |S| = 3, {1} ∈ S and i 	= 1
hi,S = 13 for every i ∈ S if |S| = 3 and {1} /∈ S.
Finally for two seller coalitions:
hi,S = 12 for every i ∈ S if |S| = 2.
Given these primitives, the game satisfies all the conditions of Proposition 3.3. One
pure strategy price equilibrium of the game is
f ∗i () = 15 for i = 1, 2
and
f ∗i ({ω1}) = 5 and f ∗i ({ω2, ω3}) = 15 for i = 3, 4.
5 Related literature
This work contributes to three active strands of research: firstly, the collection of works
that provide conditions for existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in games where
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sellers compete in prices to supply homogeneous products; 9 secondly, the class of the
literature that generalises equilibrium existence results to permit arbitrary sharing rules
at price ties; and thirdly, the growing literature that considers the important implica-
tions of incomplete information for workhorse models of price competition. The latter
remains an under-developed topic, partly due to the well-known technical tensions that
arise when working with discontinuous payoffs, ambiguity and asymmetric informa-
tion in competition.10 For instance, only recently has the issue of equilibrium existence
under incomplete information in a Cournot oligopoly, even with continuous payoffs,
been addressed by Einy et al. (2010).
In the first strand, Dastidar (1995) demonstrates that with strictly convex symmet-
ric cost functions and equal sharing at price ties, there exists a continuum of pure
strategy price equilibria where sellers earn positive profits and a single zero-profit
equilibrium. With cost asymmetries amongst sellers, existence is guaranteed and may
become unique. Hoernig (2002) shows that there also exists a continuum of mixed
strategy equilibria. Baye and Morgan (2002) consider a model with winner-takes-all
at price ties. They provide weak conditions on the market primitives, including the
assumption of an initial breakeven price on the monopoly profit function that guarantee
the existence of pure strategy zero-profit equilibrium.
Saporiti and Coloma (2010) consider more involved cost structures. They develop
Dastidar’s (1995) framework to analyze symmetric sellers with identical convex vari-
able costs and (possibly avoidable) fixed costs. Drawing on Panzar’s (1989) notion
of subadditivity, they provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of
pure strategy Bertrand equilibria. Specifically, when the cost function is not subad-
ditive at the output level associated with the oligopoly breakeven price, a (possibly
asymmetric) pure strategy equilibrium exists. From the opposite direction, existence
of pure strategy equilibrium precludes the cost function from being subadditive at
every output level above the oligopoly breakeven point.
Dastidar (2011a) generalizes Saporiti and Coloma (2010) to show that symmet-
ric superadditive cost functions guarantee the existence of pure strategy Bertrand
equilibrium, without assuming convexity of variable costs. Conversely, there exists
no Bertrand equilibrium if costs are symmetric and subadditive. Introducing cost-
asymmetries, however, restores existence in either pure or mixed strategies (Dastidar
2011b).
Yano and Komatsubara (2017) study duopolists’ choices between simultaneous-
move Bertrand competition and leader-follower Stackelberg competition, when
products are homogeneous but production technologies vary. Following Dastidar
(1995), sellers must meet all forthcoming demand at their chosen price with equal
sharing at price ties. When the market is tight, such that each sellers’ capacity is
low relative to the market demand, Bertrand competition is driven by the (Stackel-
berg) first-mover advantage. When the market is less tight, the followers’ disadvantage
diminishes quicker for the least efficient seller, who subsequently assumes the follower
9 Baye and Kovenock (2008) present a detailed account of this literature.
10 See He and Yannelis (2017b, p.1421) for a list of recent work on equilibrium existence with discontinuous
payoffs.
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position. As tightness decreases further, the efficient seller may also accept a follower
position, inducing multiple equilibria where either firm can become the leader.
The second strand considers the link between sharing rules at price ties and equi-
librium existence. Hoernig (2007) considers general properties for sharing rules that
permit the application of Reny’s (1999) benchmark existence results for pure and
mixed strategy equilibria. A pure strategy equilibrium exists whenever the sharing
rule is weakly tie-decreasing, coalition monotone, the sum of payoffs is upper semi-
continuous and non-tied payoffs are continuous. Tie-decreasing requires that the payoff
each tied player receives is non-increasing when an additional player joins the tie,
which generates quasiconcave payoffs. Coalition monotone imposes that the sum of
the tied players’ payoffs increases with the number of tied sellers. With symmetric
non-tied payoffs, all players receive zero payoff. With asymmetric non-tied payoffs,
one player may earn positive profit. Bagh (2010) provides alternative conditions for
equilibrium existence for a wide range of arbitrary but deterministic sharing rules.
Continuity and monotonicity requirements in Hoernig (2007) are replaced with strictly
convex costs and mild assumptions on the demand function. In both Hoernig (2007)
and Bagh (2010), sellers’ information is complete.
The third strand concerns the growing economic recognition of the importance of
ambiguity for individual choice, which can be traced to Ellsberg’s (1961) famous urn
experiments.11 When players cannot attach probabilities to outcomes, choices need
not be consistent with standard subjective expected utility maximisation and the tra-
ditional game theoretic machinery breaks down (Fellner 1961; Pulford and Colman
2007). Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) developed Savage’s (1954) subjective expected
utility framework to provide an axiomatic characterisation of maximin expected util-
ity, according to which decision making is driven by the minimum utility across the
set of probabilities that are consistent with the available information (Al-Najjar and
Weinstein 2009).
Incomplete information has drastic implications. For instance, the Bertrand para-
dox of marginal cost pricing with only two sellers, is quickly overturned. When sellers
have symmetric uncertainty regarding their rivals’ costs but know their own cost, equi-
librium involves pricing above cost (Spulber 1995). When marginal costs are constant
but uncertain and sellers are risk averse, losses are overweighted in the expected
utility function. Therefore, equilibrium must involve positive expected profits that
persist as market concentration decreases (Wambach 1999). The disruptive effects
of incomplete information are not confined to price competition. Einy et al. (2010)
consider Bayesian output-setting oligopolists with incomplete information regarding
state-contingent production costs and market demand. They provide conditions for
the existence and uniqueness of pure strategy Nash equilibrium without permitting
negative prices.
Maximin preferences address the growing discontent with Bayesian utilities under
uncertainty and feature several favourable properties (He and Yannelis 2015a). Firstly,
in discontinuous games with incomplete information and Bayesian players, equilib-
rium existence often follows from strengthening the restrictions on the conditions in
11 See Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2009) for a critical assessment of the ambiguity aversion literature and
Sugden (1991) for a survey of the roots of rational choice.
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the complete information analogue. For instance, He and Yannelis (2015b) introduce
a stronger notion of Reny’s (1999) payoff security and impose quasiconcave expected
utilities to guarantee equilibrium existence with Bayesian players under asymmetric
and incomplete information. He and Yannelis (2017a), however, recently demonstrated
that maximin utiilities overcome the need to introduce additional assumptions. Specif-
ically, maximin equilibrium existence “follows immediately from the existence of
equilibrium in every ex-post game” (He and Yannelis 2017a, p.120). Moreover, if
we were to impose the conditions on non-tied payoffs outlined in Hoernig (2007)
and remove our requirement of measurability of prices with respect to sellers’ private
information, equilibrium existence follows directly from He and Yannelis (2017a,
Proposition 1).
Secondly, maximin preferences overcome the well-known conflict between incen-
tive compatibility and efficiency that arises with Bayesian expected utility preferences
(de Castro and Yannelis 2011; Holmstrom and Myerson 1983). Moreover, maximin is
the unique preference relation that ensures any efficient outcome is incentive compati-
ble. The intuition follows that in equilibrium agents equalise utilities across all possible
states. Therefore, individuals have no incentive to misreport their private information
once it is received.12
Correia-da-Silva and Hervés-Beloso (2009) study maximin preferences in an exten-
sion of an Arrow–Debreu asymmetric information general equilibrium model. They
analyse trade contracts when individuals choose between lists of bundles of products.
The bundle that is delivered is state dependent, where agents hold incomplete and
asymmetric information over future states. Decisions are prudent in the sense that
agents consider the worst possible outcome and this expectation may be confirmed.
In equilibrium individuals, choose bundles that yield constant utility across uncertain
states. Therefore, consumption decisions need not be measurable with respect to the
information of each individual but the contingent lists must be. Correia-da-Silva and
Hervés-Beloso (2012) depart from prudent equilibrium to consider agents who always
receive (and, therefore, expect to receive) the cheapest consumption bundle on the list.
They impose that at least one agent can verify the true state, which prevents false infor-
mation disclosures. They establish equilibrium existence in such an environment. de
Castro et al. (2017) also study implementation under ambiguity using maximin pref-
erences. They show that maximin equilibrium is consistent with individually rational
non-cooperative strategies under ambiguity.
6 Concluding remarks
The aim of this work has been to analyze a general incomplete information extension
of the classical Bertrand price game which permits a wide variety of sharing rules at
price ties and asymmetries of information amongst the sellers of the type usually only
studied in the general equilibrium literature. The results indicate that, if no seller has
a monopoly over their private information, sellers’ costs are not too different, and the
sharing rule at price ties is not too different from the equal sharing rule, then there exists
12 See de Castro and Yannelis (2011), Sect. 1, for an appraisal of the applications of maximin preferences.
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a continuum of pure strategy price equilibria. In this sense, the model demonstrates
that, even if sellers have asymmetric information about the state of the world, and
the sharing rule is different from equal sharing, there may still be positive existence
results similar to those presented by Dastidar (1995), and generalized in the subsequent
literature on price competition. Furthermore, our results permitted discontinuities in
both the monopoly and tied profit functions arising from discontinuities in the market
demand. We conclude this work with several possibilities for extending the model
which the authors hope to pursue in future research.
• Although maximin decision rules have been recently applied to a wide range
of economic models, there is an alternative way of modelling ambiguity which
is to use capacities. A capacity has the properties of a probability measure, but
may violate the standard additivity properties. This alternative way of modelling
probability beliefs can be parametrized, as in Eichberger and Kelsey (1999), with
the parameter measuring the degree of confidence an individual has about the
different possible probabilities they face. Our model has only considered maximin
preferences, which although simple and tractable, represent the polar extreme in
which individuals are wholly unable to assign beliefs to unknown probabilities. It
would be interesting to see whether any of the results could be extended to permit
capacity-type modelling of ambiguity beliefs.
• The results in this work indicate that there may be a continuum of pure strategy price
equilibria. However, these results do not indicate if some of these pure strategy
price equilibria are more convincing, or have more desirable properties, than others.
One particular refinement of the Nash equilibrium set which has been applied to
Bertrand price games is coalition-proofness.13 The idea of coalition-proof equilib-
rium was introduced by Bernheim et al. (1987) and is appropriate in settings where
players can communicate with each other to enact coalitional strategy deviations,
but cannot commit to these deviations.14 As a result, any proposed deviations have
to be self-enforcing. Chowdhury and Sengupta (2004) established the existence
of coalition-proof equilibrium in homogeneous-good Bertrand games under quite
general conditions. In the incomplete information Bertrand game studied here, we
could admit the possibility that sellers could communicate at the ex ante stage to
enact coalition deviations. What the appropriate definition of coalition-proofness
should be in this context and whether such a refinement of the equilibrium set
exists are interesting open questions.15
• Throughout the paper, we have focussed on maximin expected utilities at the
ex ante stage. As was noted, these remedy some of the difficult technical issues
which arise with Bayesian utilities. But it remains an interesting open question
whether equilibrium existence could be established with Bayesian expected util-
ities. Unfortunately, the existence results of He and Yannelis (2015b) cannot be
13 Although recently Andersson et al. (2014) have studied an alternative refinement of the equilibrium
set in price games, based on strategic uncertainty, and have shown that it selects prices different from the
coalition-proof equilibrium.
14 Coalition-proofness has been applied to a wide range of different games, including cooperative games,
as in Habis and Herings (2011).
15 In defining coalition-proof equilibrium at the ex ante stage, one would have to take into account the
possibility that sellers could share their private information as in Wilson (1978).
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applied to such a game because non-tied payoffs can be higher than tied payoffs
and, consequently, the Bertrand game tends not to be better reply secure. Indeed,
even the complete information game studied in Dastidar (1995) is not better reply
secure. However, it may be possible to understand whether an equilibrium exists
with Bayesian expected utilities by exploiting the well-known properties of the ex
post price games.
• Although we have assumed that the sellers tieing at the minimum price meet all the
market demand forthcoming, there is a large literature on price games with capacity
constraints and rationing rules: the Bertrand–Edgeworth approach to price com-
petition. This literature has provided important insights into the competitive limit
in large markets, and when we should expect price-making behaviour to result in
outcomes close to the competitive equilibrium of markets. As far as the authors are
aware, there has been little research on extending the standard Bertrand–Edgeworth
price game to permit asymmetric information. This is probably due to the tech-
nical difficulties as equilibria in Bertrand–Edgeworth games are usually only in
mixed strategies.16 It would be interesting, however, to see whether the Bertrand–
Edgeworth game could be generalized to permit asymmetries of information of
the type we have studied here.
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Appendix
This appendix contains three lemmas, and their proofs, which were used to prove the
main results.
Lemma 7.1 Fix a price game G = (N ,, (Ci , Pi )i∈N , {ri,S}i∈N ,S∈Si , D, μ), r ∈
{g, h}. Then
(i) the real numbers li,S(ω) and mi (ω) are well defined.
(ii) if r = g, the sharing rule is deterministic, then li,S(ω) < mi (ω).
Proof (i) From Assumption 2.2, D(0, ω) = y¯(ω) > 0. Hence, πi,S(0, ω) < 0 and
πi (0, ω) < 0. From Assumption 2.4, the functions achieve strictly positive values
and are left lower semicontinuous, so the sets
Li,S(ω) = {x |0 ≤ x < x¯(ω) and πi,S(x, ω) = 0}
and
Mi (ω) = {x |0 ≤ x < x¯(ω) and πi (x, ω) = 0}.
16 If one imposes strong conditions upon the demand function, then pure strategy price equilibria may exist
even with capacity constraints (Tasnadi 1999)
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are non-empty and their minimums are well defined. Let li,S(ω) = min Li,S(ω)
and mi (ω) = min Mi (ω).
(ii) Suppose li,S(ω) = a and mi (ω) = b. From the definition of li,S(ω), we have
agi,S(a)D(a, ω) − Ci (gi,S(a)D(a, ω)) = 0
which implies
a = Ci (gi,S(a)D(a, ω))
gi,S(a)D(a, ω)
.
Similarly, from the definition of b, we have
bD(b, ω) − Ci (D(b, ω)) = 0
which implies
b = C(D(b, ω))
D(b, ω)
.
Suppose a contradiction to the statement in the lemma: mi (ω) ≤ li,S(ω). Then,
b ≤ a and
Ci (D(b, ω))
D(b, ω)
≤ Ci (gi,S(a)D(a, ω))
gi,S(a)D(a, ω)
.
However, as b ≤ a, D(b, ω) ≥ D(a, ω) > gi,S(a)D(a, ω), this contradicts the
strict convexity of the cost function Ci (·, ω). Hence, li,S(ω) < mi (ω). unionsq
Lemma 7.2 Fix a price game G = (N ,, (Ci , Pi )i∈N , {ri,S}i∈N ,S∈Si , D, μ) with a
deterministic sharing rule r = g, if x ′ > li,S(ω) then πi,S(x ′, ω) ≥ 0.
Proof If x ′ ≥ x¯(ω) then D(x ′, ω) = 0 and πi,S(x ′, ω) = 0. Suppose x ′ > li,S(ω)
and x ′ < x¯(ω). As x ′ > li,S(ω), there is an x ′′ such that x ′ > x ′′ > li,S(ω) and
πi,S(x ′′, ω) ≥ 0. As πi,S(x ′′, ω) ≥ 0, we have
x ′′ ≥ Ci (gi,S(x
′′)D(x ′′, ω))
gi,S(x ′′)D(x ′′, ω)
.
As x ′ > x ′′, the strict convexity of the cost function and Assumption 3.1 yields
Ci (gi,S(x ′′)D(x ′′, ω))
gi,S(x ′′)D(x ′′, ω)
≥ Ci (gi,S(x
′)D(x ′, ω))
gi,S(x ′)D(x ′, ω)
.
Hence
x ′ > x ′′ ≥ Ci (gi,S(x
′′)D(x ′′, ω))
gi,S(x ′′)D(x ′′, ω)
≥ Ci (gi,S(x
′)D(x ′, ω))
gi,S(x ′)D(x ′, ω)
which implies πi,S(x ′, ω) > 0. unionsq
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Lemma 7.3 Fix a price game G = (N ,, (Ci , Pi )i∈N , {ri,S}i∈N ,S∈Si , D, μ). If x ′ >
mi (ω) then πi (x ′, ω) ≥ 0.
Proof If x ′ ≥ x¯(ω) then D(x ′, ω) = 0 and πi (x ′, ω) = 0. Suppose x ′ > mi (ω)
and x ′ < x¯(ω). As x ′ > mi (ω), there is an x ′′ such that x ′ > x ′′ > mi (ω) and
πi (x
′′, ω) ≥ 0. As πi (x ′′, ω) ≥ 0, we have
x ′′ ≥ Ci (D(x
′′, ω))
D(x ′′, ω)
.
As x ′ > x ′′, again the strict convexity of the cost function yields
Ci (D(x ′′, ω))
D(x ′′, ω)
≥ Ci (D(x
′, ω))
D(x ′, ω)
.
Hence
x ′ > x ′′ ≥ Ci (D(x
′′, ω))
D(x ′′, ω)
≥ Ci (D(x
′, ω))
D(x ′, ω)
which implies πi (x ′, ω) > 0. unionsq
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